Landslide management in the UK— the problem of managing hazards in a ‘low-risk’ environment by Gibson, A.D. et al.
LANDSLIDE MANAGEMENT IN THE UK, – THE PROBLEM OF MANAGING HAZARDS IN A ‘LOW RISK’ 
ENVIRONMENT 
A D Gibson1, M G Culshaw2, C Foster3, C V L Pennington3 
1 School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK (formerly, 
British Geological Survey, Nottingham, UK) 
2 School of Civil Engineering, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK and British Geological 
Survey, Nottingham, UK 
3 British Geological Survey, Nottingham, UK 
 
 ABSTRACT 
As a country with limited direct experience of natural disasters, the UK has not developed a 
sophisticated legal and regulatory framework for the mitigation for many of the geological hazards, 
including landslides, which affect the population.  Although the 1966 Aberfan disaster led to a limited 
amount of research into landslide distribution and mechanisms, it left no long-term legacy of 
managing landslide risks.  A number of high-profile events in the late 20th Century, and a series of 
‘near-misses’ since then have failed to stimulate a significant social or economic awareness.  Perhaps 
understandably, this has limited political motivation to develop landslide management policies.  This 
paper examines this situation and discusses some implications of how landslides are dealt with by the 
UK government and devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Policy is based mainly upon national assessments of geohazards (including landslides) carried out in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  These assessments provided the basis for planning policies and guidance that 
to some degree control development on or around unstable ground.  Although this was an 
encouraging start, limited resources and political support over the longer term ultimately meant 
these initiatives failed to develop into an effective, integrated, national response to landslide hazards.  
Policies and regulations are open to interpretations which vary between devolved governments, 
building regulations and local planning offices. 
Crucially, the resulting system offers no framework for the legal or financial responsibilities for hazard 
management.  As a result, landslide management in the UK has been influenced more by planning 
and political structure than actual risks to the population.  This situation partially arises from the 
limited data available on the overall cost of landslides on a national basis.  Until this situation is 
rectified it will be difficult to establish a mitigation strategy based on risk. 
This paper discusses how landslides are managed in the UK and provides examples from around the 
country of how the system responded to some serious landslides occurring over the last twenty years.  
Examples are presented that show how this framework has affected the investigation and mitigation 
of different types of landslides.  The paper also briefly discusses the role of insurance in landslide 
hazard management and highlights the effective response of Transport Scotland in the aftermath of 
the debris flows in 2004. 
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 GEOHAZARDS AND LANDSLIDE HAZARDS IN THE UK 
In an international context, the UK is relatively unaffected by major disasters.  The country is 
seismically stable, contains no active volcanoes, has few active large-scale inland landslides (though 
there are a number of active coastal ones where marine erosion contributes to instability, for 
example, at Black Ven in Dorset and Sidestrand in Norfolk) or karst failures and, due to its temperate 
climate, has few problems with droughts or wildfires.  Swelling, and particularly shrinkage, of clay 
soils cause the largest ongoing financial losses of any ground condition (Culshaw & Harrison 2010) but 
do not cause injury or loss of life.  Economically, storms and flooding are the most significant hydro-
meteorological hazards, which for the June-July 2007 floods, caused around £4bn of damage - £3bn in 
insurance claims (Pitt 2008) and about £1bn in further costs (Chatterton et al. 2010).  However, flood 
events are not regular and only affect limited parts of the UK landmass, along the lengths of certain 
vulnerable floodplains and coastal areas.  This relative safety has had a pervasive effect upon the 
attitudes of the general public, planners, politicians and even some geoscience professionals towards 
geohazards, when compared with other countries in geologically less stable areas.  
The largest loss of life caused by a single landslide in the UK occurred on 21st October 1966 when a 
waste tip formed by coal spoil failed and destroyed a school in the South Wales town of Aberfan, 
killing 144 people, most of whom were children (Anon. 1967).  In recent years, the only other 
landslide incidents to result in multiple fatalities involved a school party at Lulworth Cove, 21st 
February 1977, and an incidence at Boscombe, Wiltshire, which killed 3 workmen in 1925.  
All recorded deaths due to landsliding in the UK have resulted from rock falls or debris flows (Table 1).  
Despite the small dataset, the nature of fatal landslides shown provides a number of important points 
relevant to the basis of land-use planning in relation to landslides in the UK.  First, there are very few 
fatal landslides in the UK.  Second, fatal landslides are very isolated and tend to involve only single 
individuals.  Third, there is no consistent pattern from year to year.  
Table 1.  Recorded fatal landslides in the UK categorised by type and by the activity of the casualties 
at the time of the incident.  Indirect fatalities such as vehicle collisions or dam bursts are not included, 
nor are those fatalities occurring in quarries. 
Landslide Event Year Killed Type (after 
Varnes 1978) 
Geographical 
setting 
Newbiggin, Northumberland 2010 1 Rock fall Coast 
Whitehaven, Cumbria  2007 1 Debris fall Coast 
Ben Nevis, Lochaber 2006 1 Rock fall Mountain 
Nefyn, Gwynedd  2001 1 Debris flow Coast 
Newquay, Cornwall 1986 1 Rock fall Coast 
Durdle Door, Dorset 1979 1 Rock fall Coast 
Lulworth Cove, Dorset  1977 3 Rock fall Coast 
Swanage Bay, Dorset 1976 1 Rock fall Coast 
Kimmeridge Bay, Dorset 1971 1 Rock fall Coast 
Aberfan, S Wales  1966 144 Debris flow Hillside/spoil tip 
Alum Bay, Isle of Wight 1959 1 Rock fall Coast 
Boscombe, Wiltshire  1925 3 Rock fall Coast 
Loch Ness, Scotland 1877 1 Rock fall Mountain 
 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the dataset, there also appears, once the Aberfan disaster is 
removed, to be a trend of increased reported fatal landsliding in the UK during and since the 1970s.  
Further research is underway to investigate this pattern, but it is possibly a result of increasing 
utilisation of coastal sections for leisure activities (French 1997).  The trend may also reflect a general 
increase in UK society’s sensitivity to the impacts of natural disasters.  
 
Regardless of the statistical significance, it is difficult to underestimate the wider impact of the 
Aberfan disaster upon British society.  Prior to this event, there was little government interest in 
mitigating any dangerous ground – rebuilding the economy and national infrastructure following 
World War II was the priority, with resources prioritised towards developing the manufacturing 
sector, and supporting exploitation of energy and mineral resources.  The disaster prompted a 
government-appointed Tribunal of Inquiry into the landslide (Anon. 1967).  Research into mapping 
landslides was stimulated in the 1960/70s after unexpected problems during construction projects 
highlighted ground movement as a potentially significant problem in other parts of the country (Early 
and Skempton 1972; Skempton and Weeks 1976; Chandler 1970). 
In the mid-1980s, the UK Government's Department of the Environment (DOE) commissioned a study 
to build a national register (database) of landslides in Great Britain (not the UK, therefore omitting 
Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man).  This was completed in 1994 by 
Geomorphological Services Limited (GSL) in collaboration with Rendel, Palmer and Tritton. The work 
was effectively a desk study of readily available information sources (including British Geological 
Survey [henceforth referred to as BGS] maps, which provided over 35% of the recorded landslides) 
and built a picture of 8835 landslides (Jones & Lee 1994). 
However, as discussed by those authors and elsewhere (Foster et al. 2008), the study was limited and 
underestimated the landsliding problem in Britain (because it was based on information in the public 
domain [Jones & Lee 1994]).  Anticipated long-term funding (from sales of information or research 
grants) to develop the database was not forthcoming and further formal studies ceased.  
However, this study did produce the first overview of the pattern of landslides and landslide hazards 
across the country.  Though limited in detail, it provided sufficient information to inform government 
on the development of planning policy for landslide mitigation.  Further papers describe the new BGS 
National Landslide Database that has been developed since 2000 (Foster et al. 2008; Pennington et al. 
2009; Foster et al. in press).  By the end of 2010, the BGS National Landslide Database contained 
information on over 15 000 landslides in Great Britain. 
Since 2006, the BGS has also collated information on landslides reported in the media that have 
affected the UK (Table 2).  This shows that there are an average of about 28 reported landslides in the 
UK every year.  However, not all these landslides will be added into the BGS National Landslide 
Database, as some information reported lacks detail and cannot be verified without field evidence; 
there are between 10-15 new landslides entered into the BGS National Landslide Database each year.   
Table 2.  Landslides reported in the media in the UK, April 2005-December 2010. 
Year Number of landslides 
2010  38 
2009 38 
2008 10 
2007 38 
2006 32 
2005 (from April) 11 
 
The BGS has also developed a Geographical Information System (GIS)-based system, GeoSure, to 
assess the principal geological hazards across the country (Foster et al. 2008; Walsby 2007, 2008).  
The output from this is a series of GIS layers that provide ratings of the susceptibility of the country to 
landsliding on an A-E scale, where A is very low susceptibility and E is very high susceptibility (a 
simplified small-scale version of the map is shown in Fig. 1).  The model has been produced at 
1:50 000 scale and can be usefully output as a map to show the spatial distribution of landslide 
susceptibility.  By comparing this with the known locations of population centres and properties the 
model can be used to provide a useful estimate of the significance of landsliding nationally.  
According to the dataset, 350 000 households in the UK, representing 1% of all housing stock, are in 
areas considered to have a 'significant' (susceptibility zones D and E) landslide susceptibility.   
 
Fig. 1 Landslide susceptibility map of Great Britain derived from the BGS GeoSure model.  This 
version of the dataset has been produced for the general public, with susceptibility zones used to 
depict areas of low to nil, moderate or significant landslide potential.  The map is based on data at an 
original scale of 1:50 000 
In the authors’ experience of working with geologists, civil engineers, planners, politicians and the 
general public, landslides are recognised as a problem but the threat that they pose to life, property 
and infrastructure is not always well understood.  Many scientists and engineers seem to regard them 
as a localised problem, occurring only at a limited number of sites, or under extreme weather 
conditions.  In the light of this perception, this paper uses the increased amounts of recently available 
information on landslide susceptibility and from case studies, to discuss how landslides are managed 
in the UK.  
 LAND-USE PLANNING FOR LANDSLIDES IN THE UK 
There is no centralised, legally binding mechanism for the management or mitigation of landslides in 
the UK.  Issues relating to landslide problems are dealt with under common law and the primary 
responsibility is with the landowner (Department of the Environment 1996).  The planning system, 
through the Town and Country Planning Act (1990), regulates the development of land and its powers 
are exercised through Local Authorities.  The Housing Acts (various) and Building Regulations Act also 
allow the Local Authorities to exercise control over certain aspects of development.  Similarly, the 
Construction (Design and Management) (CDM) Regulations (Anon. 2007) also are relevant to safe 
construction.  Further considerations of public safety are made in the Coal Mining (Subsidence) Act 
(1991), Coal Industry Act (1994) and Occupiers Liability Acts (1957, 1984).  The elements of these 
regulations and acts relevant to Local Authorities regarding landslide management are: 
1. Strategic planning: production of a development plan, which, once approved by central 
government, is a blueprint for development of the whole area for at least the next 10 years (Alker 
et al. 2002).  
2. Development control: provide planning permissions for (re)development that accord with the 
development plan ensuring that these meet all statutory and regulatory requirements (Alker et 
al. 2002). 
3. Building control: ensure that buildings are designed, constructed or altered so as to be 
structurally safe and robust (Anon. 2004). 
4. Emergency planning: plans prepared for, and enacted in the event of, crises and disasters 
(Alexander 2002).   
The Government has advised planning authorities, through Planning Policy Statements (PPS) 1 and 
12, that the planning system must regulate the development of land in the public interest and take 
into account whether proposals would affect amenities, building and land which should be protected 
in the public interest (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2005; Communities and Local Government 
2007, 2008).  Further guidance covering unstable land (including landslides) is given in Planning Policy 
Guidance Notes, PPG14 and Annexes (Department of the Environment 1990, 1996; Department for 
Transport, Local Government and the Regions 2002) which set out the responsibility of the developer 
to determine whether the land is suitable for the proposed purpose.  PPG14 and its annexes provide 
guidance on how slope instability should be considered in any planning decision and that, if 
landsliding is a known issue, ‘a developer’ must provide evidence that any development activity will 
not exacerbate landslide activity and that any building will be safe.  The guidance note related to 
slope instability is not legally binding.  It does state that “The stability of the ground in so far as it 
affects land use is a material consideration which should be taken into account when deciding a 
planning application.”  However, it goes on to state that: “Many local planning authorities may not, in 
any event, have the required expertise available to them.  Where relevant expertise is available on 
issues such as mineral planning, waste disposal, land reclamation, building control, surveying or 
engineering, the local authority should endeavour to make use of it.”  The list does not include 
geological or geotechnical expertise but details of some sources of information are provided, 
including the BGS.  There is no legal compulsion for a planning authority to understand the extent or 
nature of landslide hazards within their area of concern and, thus, include them in planning decisions. 
Building regulations provide a further control on the impact of slope instability requiring that “The 
building shall be constructed so that ground movement caused by (a) swelling, shrinkage or freezing 
of the subsoil; or (b) land-slip or subsidence (other than subsidence arising from shrinkage), in so far 
as the risk can be reasonably foreseen, will not impair the stability of any part of the building” (Anon. 
2004).  Again, the liability is placed upon the developer, but there is no compulsion to seek out or use 
information that might indicate landslide hazard in, or around the development site.  Building 
regulations and planning policy guidance were reviewed by Brook (1991, 2007).  Brook & Marker 
(2008) warned about the threat to the perceived status of PPG/PPSs, particularly PPG14, which 
covers many geohazards, as the current planning system is 'reformed.'  These reforms may further 
diminish the degree to which planning controls can be used as a mechanism to control landslide 
hazards. 
The delivery mechanism for Health and Safety legislation is a complex series of regulations that oblige 
operators of utilities such as roads, pipelines and railways to protect citizens from any potential harm 
caused by their operations.  These mechanisms place responsibility on the operators requiring them 
to prove to the government Health and Safety Executive that their activities do not compromise the 
safety of others.  For instance, industry specific regulations require that quarry, pipeline and chemical 
warehouse operators and other such organisations must consider the potential impact of landslides 
upon their operations and any potential impact upon third parties.  Although a complex system, it 
addresses concerns for specific industries.  For instance, operators of chemical warehouses must 
submit a report which should demonstrate that the probability of a major fire is around 0.01/year.  As 
part of this report, the possibility of a landslide initiating a fire must be considered, and if it is a 
problem, it must be shown that the risk is acceptable. 
Citizens are also responsible for not causing damage to their property or that of others by 
exacerbating landslide hazards.  For the most part, this will be managed by the application of 
planning or building code regulation, enforced by local governments.  Citizens, landowners, operators 
and others will all come under the umbrella protection offered by the insurance and re-insurance 
industries.  Most insurers provide some sort of geohazard cover as part of buildings/construction 
insurance policies.  Insurers will, of course, assess risk according to their own policies and procedures 
but it is useful to consider that not all companies utilise geological data in their appraisals. 
None of these mechanisms or supporting documentation provide comprehensive, up-to-date 
guidance on: 
 the information that should be sought to assess landslide hazard; 
 sources of appropriate information; 
 how landslide information should be used and interpreted; 
 how landslide information should be presented; 
 what measures are appropriate in terms of public safety; nor 
 what measures are appropriate for long term remediation.  
The responsibility for accessing and using appropriate information always lies with the operator or 
their technical advisor.  Recently, the international scientific community has produced a series of 
guidelines for local and national government officials, land-use planners, geo-professionals and 
project managers on landslide susceptibility, hazard and risk zoning (Fell et al. 2008a, b).  These 
guidelines are similar to those produced in Australia (Australian Geomechanics Society 2007a, b).  The 
guidelines are highly technical and no attempt is made to relate them to specific planning regulations 
in individual countries. 
In the UK, current planning policy guidance, published in 1990, predates the era of GIS and advises 
that citizens consult geological maps and the Department of the Environment Landslide Database 
(now superseded by the BGS National Landslide Database [Foster et al. 2008]).  Both datasets were 
difficult to access and virtually unintelligible to anyone without a geoscience background.  
Such information has been made more accessible to the non-specialist by new geoinformation 
systems, for example, the BGS’s ‘GeoSure’, described above and by making selected information from 
the BGS National Landslide Database freely available on the Internet.  This and other data sources are 
easily accessible from a range of suppliers across the internet, yet guidance has never been updated 
to take this into account.  So, even though there have been significant improvements in geohazard 
mapping and the generation of hazard data, much at public expense, there is still no requirement to 
use or even consider it within a landslide hazard assessment. 
 THE INSURANCE OF LANDSLIDE LOSSES IN THE UK 
Losses caused by landslides were incorporated into domestic property insurance policies in the early 
1970s (Doornkamp 1995a, b; Wyles 1983).  The umbrella term 'subsidence' came to be used for 
natural ground movements whether caused by landsliding, dissolution, swelling and shrinkage of 
clays or some other geohazard process.  Indeed, the vast majority of losses incurred by the UK 
insurance industry have been caused by shrinkage of clay soils during extended periods of low 
rainfall.  These losses have occurred mainly in the south east of England. 
However, claims against 'subsidence' losses, including those caused by landslides remained very low 
throughout the 1970s and 80s.  Then, following a particularly dry period between 1989 and 1991, the 
UK insurance industry lost £1-2 bn.  Since then, losses have averaged between £3-400m per year 
(Culshaw & Harrison 2010).  Less than 5% of these losses are thought to relate to landsliding.  The 
industry realised that it needed to understand better the risks to which it was exposed from 
geological hazards.  As a result, a digital geohazard information system (GHASP – GeoHAzard 
Susceptibility Package) was developed by the BGS, which came to be used by around 35% of the 
Industry (Culshaw & Kelk 1994).  This system was developed at a time when digital geological 
information was only just becoming available.  Following the digitisation of most of the BGS spatial 
data in the early 2000s, a much improved geohazard information system (GeoSure) was developed 
(Walsby 2007; Foster et al. 2008).  However, such information systems do not appear to be 
widespread, even in the more developed world. 
Whilst buildings insurance is not compulsory, when obtained it does provide the property owner with 
a good measure of financial cover in the event of landslide damage occurring despite policy holders 
having to pay part of the cost of any claim.  The existence of such cover is of particular value to 
owners of some older properties built in landslide susceptible areas before the planning guidance 
and building control standards, described above, were developed. 
 LANDSLIDE RISK TO INFRASTRUCTURE 
It is the responsibility of infrastructure owners to assess the risks to their utility (pipeline, power line, 
road, railway, canal etc.)  However, the owners are regulated by Health and Safety legislation and the 
level of acceptable risk is set by the UK Health and Safety Executive.  As a result, infrastructure 
owners must assess the risk of damage, injury and death resulting from failure of their utility and take 
steps to reduce it to the acceptable level if the risk is too high. 
Gibson et al. (2005) described research for the major national distributor of natural gas to determine 
the distribution and potential severity of geohazards across the UK.  Of the many geohazards that 
affect the UK, landsliding and the dissolution of soluble rocks were considered to pose the greatest 
threat to the transmission network.  BGS national hazard datasets for landslide and dissolution hazard 
were truncated to buffer zones centred upon the pipeline.  These data were enhanced by detailed 
information from the BGS National Landslide Database and Karst Database (Foster et al. 2008; Foster 
et al. in prep.; Cooper et al. 2001; Cooper 2008). 
The result of this research was a set of continuous GIS layers that showed the level of susceptibility to 
landsliding or dissolution of soluble rocks at any location on the pipeline network in the UK.  The 
operator will use these data to: improve their risk assessment methodology, inform discussions on 
pipeline safety with their safety regulator and improve their surveillance strategies where it is 
considered that geohazards represent a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline. 
 RESPONSE TO MAJOR LANDSLIDES IN THE UK 
As with the planning system, response to landslide events in the UK is essentially a local matter, with 
little guidance available on the responsibilities to be taken or procedures to be followed.  In the event 
of a major landslide, initial response is controlled by the civilian emergency services, police, fire 
service and medical personnel, working with the local authority and others within the framework of 
the local authority emergency plan (Siddle 1999).  A multi-agency control centre  may be formed to 
deal with initial rescue and security efforts.  For example, following the Holbeck Hall landslide (see 
below), police and the coastguard provided security for the first 72 hours to prevent access to the 
slipped area (Clements 1994).  Once this has been completed, responsibility for the site will pass to 
the landowner of the property affected or from where the landslide was sourced.  Often it is the local 
government body or operator of a road or pipeline that will be responsible for repairing or stabilising 
the site to the extent that it will no longer pose a threat. 
Less significant events, where a landslide may not cause immediate threat to life or property but may 
cause disruption to roads or railways, such as an embankment collapse, also tend to be dealt with 
locally.  Typically, the landslide will be cleared within a few hours, with no record kept of the nature of 
disruption or repair.  The Highways Agency, for instance, which is responsible for the maintenance of 
motorways and major roads in the UK, does not routinely record landslide events that affect its 
network; rather, it records that a repair action has occurred at a certain chainage, with little 
supporting information on the nature, cause or impact of the failure.  
Some aspects of how this system operates in reality for both major and less significant landslides are 
illustrated by four case studies:  
 Holbeck Hall Hotel Landslide, Yorkshire, England, 1993 
The Holbeck Hall Hotel in Scarborough, North Yorkshire, 
England (Fig. 2), was destroyed as a result of a landslide 
that took place over a period between the night of the 3rd 
and 5th of June 1993 (West 1994; Lee et al. 1998; Lee 
1999; BGS 2008a).  The hotel had been built in 1880 close 
to the coastal cliff top; the coast was known to have been 
susceptible to movement and slipping (though not 
recognised as landsliding at that time).  Following an 
unusually wet period in May (West 1994), a pre-existing 
relict landslide reactivated and began to move downslope, 
the bulk of the movement taking place overnight.  The 
foundation of the hotel was partially undermined and 
most of the structure of the hotel subsequently collapsed 
(Fig. 3).  The remains of the hotel were demolished.  The 
subsequent movement of the slide and collapse of the hotel was sufficiently slow to allow repeat 
visits to the site to monitor progress.  The slow movement of the hotel also meant that all residents 
could be evacuated and that electricity and gas supplies could be switched off before they caused 
fire. 
 
Fig. 3 The Holbeck Hall Hotel landslide, Scarborough, North Yorkshire 
Fig. 2 Location map for the Holbeck 
Hall landslide 
The landslide occurrence led to an extensive series of legal arguments due to a dispute over who was 
ultimately responsible for the landslide – whether it was the servant landowner (the owner of the 
hotel), or the local authority upon whose land the actual slide took place, or the organisation that 
had, some years before been commissioned to investigate the potential for slope instability in the 
area.  The nature of legislation, where a duty of care is owed by the landowner (but only if they know 
the extent of the problem, and where there is no compulsion for them to fully investigate the 
problem), led to a situation where there was no clear responsibility for the event (Holbeck Hall Hotel 
Ltd v. Scarborough Borough Council, English High Court, London, 2000). 
 St Dogmaels Landslide, Pembrokeshire, South Wales, 1994 
On 14th February 1994, landsliding was reported on slopes 
above the village of St Dogmaels (also known as 
Llandudoch), Pembrokeshire, Wales, which lies on the left 
bank of the Afon (River) Teifi (Fig. 4).  This landslide (Fig. 5) 
occurred following a period of heavy rainfall.  Though the 
landslide appeared to be slow-moving and did not 
immediately threaten the village, provisions were made to 
implement the local emergency plan, which involved 
evacuating the village.  This preparation was led by the 
police with the support of the fire brigade, ambulance 
service and the military.  On advice from engineering 
geologists, it was decided not to implement the emergency 
plan, though people from houses located on the landslide 
were evacuated.  Several houses were severely affected and 
damage was caused to an 11 kV power line and to water 
mains supplies.  In the event, the landslide did not impact 
on the main village. 
Subsequent investigations showed that the landslide was a reactivation of part of an ancient (12 000 
years ago), complex, multiple retrogressive failure.  The landslide was a moderately deep-seated non-
circular failure and took place in glacio-lacustrine deposits which were up to 60m thick infilling a 
deeply-incised valley (Fletcher & Siddle 1998).  Ground movements of up to 1m began at the head of 
the landslide and gradually progressed downhill.  Movements continued for almost eight months.  
The ground movement affected the upper part of the ancient landslide, which, itself, extended down 
to the edge of the main part of the village of St Dogmaels. 
The landslide appeared to be caused by the presence of artesian and sub-artesian groundwater levels 
in the glacio-lacustrine deposits and periods of higher-than-average rainfall in the months and weeks 
leading up to the failure (Maddison 2000).  Other factors, such as the presence of a waste tip at the 
head of the landslide, poorly-maintained land-drains on the landslide and poorly-controlled drainage 
of water from springs upslope from the landslide, may have contributed to the failure.  
Planners in the local authority had no previous knowledge of the landslide.  This is not surprising as it 
was also unknown to the BGS, not being shown on the then current geological map which dated from 
the 19th century.  Also, the landslide had not been described in any of the scientific literature. 
 
Fig. 4 Location map for the St 
Dogmaels landslide 
 Fig. 5 Landsliding at St Dogmaels. Image courtesy of Dyfed Police 
 
One outcome of the landslide occurrence was the commissioning of a geological mapping and 
research project to identify geological factors relevant to planning and development in the catchment 
of the Afon Teifi (Walters et al. 1997).  The study included a detailed landslide survey which identified 
385 landslides; almost none were known previously.  The results of the study have enabled the local 
authority to provide information, to developers and others seeking planning permission for building 
and construction, on the potential for landsliding.  This must be taken into account in the submitted 
planning application. 
 Glen Ogle Landslide, Stirlingshire, Scotland, 2004 
The Glen Ogle debris flow (Fig. 6) was one of several that took 
place in the summer and autumn of 2004 in the Highlands of 
Scotland for example, on the A83 trunk road between Glen 
Kinglas and to the north of Cairndow and on the A9 to the north 
of Dunkeld (Winter et al. 2006; BGS 2008b).  This particular 
event involved two flows that crossed the A85 highway, north of 
Lochearnhead.  The slopes in this area, formed within the 
Dalradian (Late Pre-Cambrian/Cambrian) Ben Lui Schist 
Formation, are characteristic of a glaciated terrain, with flat-
topped hills (usually blanketed in peat), above steep (15-45°) 
slopes that lead down into flat-bottomed valleys.  At this 
location, the A85 road traverses the side of one of these valleys, 
as a narrow two lane, single carriageway highway.  Existing 
streams and channels in the schist are culverted underneath the 
road. 
On 18th August, a debris flow was triggered by an intense rainfall event that displaced a small peat 
slide into one of the streams that would normally drain through one of the road culverts (Fig. 7).  This 
peat slide set off a cascade within the stream channel, first ripping up weathered bedrock, then 
mobilising a relict deposit of granular head/landslide material.  This dense flow moved rapidly down 
slope, scouring superficial materials on the way and eventually overwhelming the drainage culvert 
designed to protect the road.  The flows entirely blocked the highway, trapping 57 people in 20 
vehicles, with potential for further failures.  All 57 people were airlifted to safety by military 
Fig. 6 Location map for the Glen 
Ogle landslide 
helicopters. Vehicles were retrieved over the next 48 hours, after the debris flow had been cleared.  
The emergency evacuation was a complete success.  However, disruption to the road was significant 
and lasted for weeks after the flow.  A key outcome from this event was the realisation by Transport 
Scotland, that there was little strategic information on the debris flow problems that affected upland 
Scotland.  As a direct result, a study was commissioned, which developed a model of the distribution 
of potential debris flows in Scotland, and the risks to the road network associated with them (Winter 
et al. 2005).  The final results of this study were published by Winter et al. (2008) and will probably 
form the basis of a programme of remediation and further investigation of the problem. 
 
Fig. 7 Debris flow deposit at Glen Ogle. 
 
 Nefyn Landslide, Gwynedd, North Wales, 2001 
The fourth example presented did involve a fatality and 
further illustrates the danger in the UK posed by debris on 
steep slopes.  The slide involved a mass of only 100m3 of 
material, moving just 12m down slope.  The landslide 
occurred at Nefyn, Gwynedd, on the north coast of Wales 
(Fig. 8).  The coastal slopes in this area comprise a complex 
sequence of Glacial Till and Pro-glacial outwash deposits.  
Over the past 16 000 years, these deposits have been 
affected by deep-seated rotational landslides, coastal 
erosion, periglaciation and weathering, resulting in a coastal 
cliff, 60m in height, with a distinctive stepped profile and a 
series of sub-horizontal benches separated by low cliffs.  The 
horizontal benches have provided flat ground where debris, 
comprising weathered soil from the cliff and rotten 
vegetation, had accumulated in thicknesses of up to 8m.  The days preceding the landslide had been 
characterised by very high rainfall, which had left the debris accumulation saturated.  On 2nd January 
2001, a small landslide in the upper cliff moved down slope onto the debris accumulation, causing 
this to fail by undrained loading (Fig. 9).  Two separate debris lobes moved down slope, engulfing a 
number of parked vehicles, pushing two of them over a low sea cliff, resulting in a fatality to an 
Fig. 8  Location map for the Nefyn 
landslide 
occupant of one of the cars and serious injury to another. 
The emergency response to the landslide was controlled by local police and fire officers who made 
the area safe and allowed access to investigation crews and specialist personnel (Fig. 10).  Following 
the event, the BGS was commissioned to carry out an investigation into the cause of the landslide and 
the surrounding area.  The result was a hazard map that provided guidance on future development in 
the vicinity (Gibson & Humpage 2002; Gibson et al. 2002; Jenkins et al. 2007).  The report 
recommended that no development be allowed on, or below, the debris covered slopes; this 
recommendation has been followed and no new development has been allowed.  However, there is 
no mechanism to prevent alterations, improvements or repair to existing property in the area.  Since 
the 2001 landslide, a number of nearby properties have been damaged by small landslides and have 
been rebuilt.  There is no legal mechanism to prevent this so long as there is no risk posed to third 
parties by the actions of the property owners. 
 
Fig. 9 Sequence of landslide events at Nefyn, 2 January 2001 
 
Fig. 10 Landslide at Nefyn.  Note the dark mudslide at the top of the slope (right hand side of the 
image) that could have triggered a similar debris flow above a residential property.  Image courtesy of 
North Wales Police 
 RESPONSIVE MANAGEMENT OF LANDSLIDES IN THE UK 
Although there are only a few examples presented here, they have been selected to illustrate the 
response to landslides that had a direct impact on people.  When a landslide event occurs in the UK 
that requires emergency action, the response, by the emergency services, military, local government 
officials and general public is exemplary.  It appears, from the case studies, that incidents are dealt 
with promptly in a well-structured and well-considered manner to ensure that public safety is 
maintained.  In the case of the Nefyn landslide, this was confirmed by the Coroner's Court set up to 
inquire into the death that occurred.  Each of the events presented here was followed by some form 
of investigation or review of the cause and impact of the landslide and led to follow-on actions, 
usually in the form of a public inquiry followed by a change in local planning policy or, in the case of 
the Glen Ogle debris flow, a national-scale study to fully investigate and assess the problem. 
 FINANCIAL LOSSES DUE TO LANDSLIDES IN THE UK 
A brief examination of recent events presented by this paper shows that there have been, on average, 
around 28 landslide events in Britain each year reported by the media since 2005 (Table 2).  As 
recording of new events and further research into past events continues, this picture may become 
clearer.  Several of these events caused significant disruption to important transport links and had 
financial impacts of several million pounds.  
Little information has been found about the total economic costs of landslides in the UK.  For the 
Holbeck Hall landslide, economic costs, including emergency response, engineering works and 
insurance claims have been estimated as being in excess of £3.5m (£2m insurance claim and £1.5m 
for the emergency protection scheme needed to protect the slope from further landslides [Byles 
1994; Clements 1994, Isle of Wight Centre for the Coastal Environment 2006, Forster et al. 2006]).  
For the St Dogmaels landslide costs were around £2.5m (£1.9m for the remediation scheme [Anon. 
1999] and at least £0.5m for the demolished or damaged houses).  However, costs are not available 
for  the 2004 Scottish debris flows (including the Glen Ogle debris flows) and the Nefyn landslide of 
2001.  Costs for smaller landslides are very variable according to the assets they affect.  For example, 
the Pennan landslide in Aberdeenshire in 2007 cost around £600 000 for stabilisation alone (BBC, 
2009); the Cooper’s Hill landslide in Gloucestershire cost £1.24m for stabilisation (BBC, 2011).  
These estimates of cost relate mostly to the direct cost of remediation.  Little information is available 
on the indirect costs such as the cost of disruption to traffic and to the local economy.  These figures 
do not take into account a further category of landslides: those well known complexes that have a 
continuing impact upon specific locations.  These include the large areas of landsliding that affect the 
coastal towns of Ventnor, Isle of Wight (for example, Hutchinson & Bromhead 2002; Lee & Moore 
2007; McInnes 2007), Lyme Regis, West Dorset (for example, Clark et al. 2000; Sellwood et al. 2000), 
Scarborough, North Yorkshire (for example, Lee & Clark 2000) and the World Heritage Site of 
Ironbridge, Shropshire, (for example, Culshaw 1973a, b; Carson & Fisher 1991).  The continuing costs 
of some these major UK landslide complexes are available.  For example, the total cost of the 
Ventnor Undercliff landslide on the Isle of Wight has averaged £1.4m per year over the last twenty 
years in terms of structural damage, insurance costs, engineering measures and monitoring (McInnes 
et al. 2000).  Since 1990, investigation and engineering works at Lyme Regis have cost over £30m 
(including works not directly involved with slope stabilisation or coast protection), with a further 
£23m requested for future developments (Lyme Regis Environment Improvements Team pers. comm.,  
2011; Anon. 2010).  Landslide research, investigation, mitigation and remediation have been going on 
at some of these locations for more than 50 years.  For example, in the Ironbridge Gorge, Henkel & 
Skempton (1954) discussed the causes of the Jackfield landslide that ultimately contributed to the 
closure of a railway line and the placing of previously buried services on the ground surface where 
they need regular maintenance.  Carson & Fisher (1991) suggested that the landslide may have been 
active for over 200 years.  In addition, a government review of the cost of coastal erosion in the UK 
found that the average cost was £126m per year, a significant part of which (not identified by the 
study) actually resulted from landsliding (Office of Science and Technology, 2003).  However, such 
schemes are usually integrated with environmental improvement schemes that have design briefs far 
outside that of simple landslide remediation. 
The figures above cover major landslides, long-term landslide complexes and small disruptive events.  
Further small losses are experienced in relation to houses.  The BGS estimates that 350 000 houses in 
the UK are in areas where there is a significant landslide susceptibility.  In December 2010, the 
average purchase price of a house in the UK was approximately £162 435 (Source: Halifax House Price 
Index:http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/media/pdfs/halifax/2011/HousePriceIndexDecember2010
FINAL2.doc).  This means that, in the worst case, there is, potentially, about £57bn worth of housing 
stock at significant risk of landslide damage in the UK.  Hypothetically, if 1% of those properties 
received 1% damage in any given year, the total losses would be in the region of £5.7m per year.  The 
figure seems to be in broad agreement with anecdotal evidence from the UK insurance industry on 
their losses from landsliding.  However, specific data on insured losses to housing is not easily 
available.  This is partly because losses caused by a range of geohazards (for example, swell-shrink, 
dissolution, compressible soils and others, as well as landslides) are grouped together under the 
misleading category ‘subsidence’ (Culshaw & Harrison 2010).  
Taking all the costs above together, these losses might be considered to be large enough to warrant 
greater concern, even though injury and loss of life from landslides is very low.  This is particularly the 
case if the climate becomes wetter as a result of climate change and the number of landslides 
increases.  However, no systematic assessment of annual losses (including death and injury) resulting 
from landsliding in the UK has been made.  This deficiency needs to be rectified before an 
appropriate response (if any) can be determined.  This is a similar situation to much of Europe though 
landslide cost data are available for some countries such as Spain, Sweden, Norway and Italy 
(European Environment Agency 2010). 
It is difficult to compare the losses from landslides with those resulting from other natural hazards 
such as flooding.  The Association of British Insurers has indicated that losses from flooding are 
around £500m per year (Dailey et al. 2009), while losses from geological hazards (‘subsidence’) are of 
a similar magnitude (around £350m per year [Culshaw & Harrison 2010]).  However, this figure does 
not separate out the contribution from landsliding alone.  Further research is needed to more 
accurately determine the true cost of landsliding in the UK.  Until this is done, it is difficult to 
determine if the current expenditure by government on landslide mitigation is appropriate. 
 THE IMPORTANCE OF ‘NEAR-MISSES’ 
The case studies presented here were chosen also to illustrate a further point.  Although each of 
these events was damaging, and one fatal, they could be considered to be  ‘near-misses’ -  the 
consequences of all of these events could have been much more significant. 
The Holbeck Hall landslide could have occurred more rapidly, limiting the possibility of escape for the 
hotel residents.  Equally, the landslide could have led to fire, or could have resulted in collapse of the 
building on residents as they tried to escape.  Had the landslide occurred during the day, more people 
may have been on the beach in front of the hotel.  The St Dogmaels landslide could have continued 
downhill to engulf more densely populated parts of the village.  The Glen Ogle debris flow could have 
resulted in the deaths of some of the persons rescued.  The timing of the events, where one flow 
blocked the road, and a second trapped the parked vehicles was unusual.  The fact that no-one was 
actually struck by either flow and that neither flow travelled any distance down the roadway, into the 
vehicles was fortunate. 
Nefyn, led to the death of a resident of a nearby village and serious injury to her partner.  However, 
the occupants of other vehicles were able to escape injury.  It was also fortunate that a separate 
mudslide (right hand side of Figure 10), stopped part way up the cliff.  If it had travelled further down 
slope, it could have triggered more movement within the perched debris accumulation.  This could 
have triggered a similar debris flow to the fatal slide.  In this instance, the flow would have impacted 
on a part-wooden building used as a restaurant and could have injured or trapped the customers that 
were inside at the time.  
Between them, the authors of this paper have investigated or reported on many landslides which 
could be considered to be 'near-misses,' and a great many more case studies could have been 
presented in this paper.  However, at some point in the near-future (years or decades), there will be a 
more tragic event that involves multiple fatalities.  As is the experience of many involved in this 
around the world, the potential for successful rescue from a landslide depends very much upon the 
nature of the failure as much as human factors such as the speed of response and medical facilities.  
Although the emergency response to each of the events described here was excellent – timely, 
structured, and well executed, there has been an amount of good fortune that the slides were of such 
a nature that rescue was possible and human losses low. 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Whilst any analyses of landslide hazard must try to indicate the real level of the problem, it is difficult 
to escape the fact that, in the UK, in a ‘normal’ year, an average landslide will cause little long-lasting 
damage and will be adequately managed by local action.  Evidence from the case histories given here 
indicates that the emergency services react promptly and effectively.  Similarly, for small landslides 
that obstruct communication links or impact on a few properties, local authorities and utility 
operators respond efficiently.  In other words, landslide management in the UK is working well at a 
responsive level. 
While emergency teams, utility operators and local authorities might be helped if they knew more 
about landslides in their area (in particular) and the risks they pose, the benefit is likely to be 
relatively small.  Knowing the type of landslide likely to occur in an area, its magnitude and the rate at 
which it might move will help preparedness and awareness but, ultimately, the response teams have 
to deal with circumstances as they find them.  Only where multiple landslides might occur (as at 
Nefyn), is prior knowledge and information likely to reduce risk to life. 
Land-use planning systems in the UK are well intentioned for new development and should, on the 
whole, reduce the potential for damage.  Planning guidance for landslides (and other geohazards) 
exists (though it is somewhat inconsistent between the devolved countries that make up the UK), as 
do appropriate building codes.  However, many local authorities lack expertise in geohazards (Brook 
& Marker 2008) and have insufficient appropriate information with which to make informed 
decisions.  Geohazard databases developed in the late 1990s to support the planning guidance were 
flawed and not kept up-to-date.  Newly created geohazard databases (Foster et al. 2008; Foster et al. 
in prep.) will rectify the flaws in the original ones (for example, Jones 1999) but will take quite some 
time to be fully populated at current rates of investment.  Once fully developed they can then be used 
in conjunction with national geohazard information systems such as GeoSure. 
Buildings insurance provides a financial safety net for existing properties.  There are flaws in the 
system in that insurance is not compulsory but at least landslides (and other geohazards) are included 
in all policies for household property insurance.  However, many insurance companies do not fully 
understand the risks and so premiums may not be set at an appropriate level. 
Health and Safety legislation drives geohazard and risk assessment for infrastructure.  Utility and 
transport network owners are required to assess the level of risk from geohazards and, if necessary, 
reduce it to the acceptable level.  This process of risk assessment generally works well when applied. 
Overall, therefore, whilst a number of mechanisms are in place to mitigate and remediate the effects 
of landslides in the UK, a strategic approach is not taken at national, regional or local level.  Rather, 
prevention is focussed at the level of an individual property or structure while everything else is 
responsive and, usually, short term.  The principle exceptions have been the development of planning 
policy guidance/statements and the response of Transport Scotland to the Glen Ogle landslide and 
others in Scotland (Winter et al. 2008). 
There is still much to be done in making a full assessment of the true landslide hazards in the UK and 
assessing the spatial, temporal, financial and human risks involved.  This research will need to 
highlight those areas most at risk from new and reactivated landslides, ensure that that risk ‘hot-
spots’ could be mitigated, and ensure that best practice is disseminated to reduce overall risks and, 
hopefully, prevent or mitigate future disasters.  However, it seems unlikely, at the present time, that a 
strategic approach to landslide management, and indeed of other geohazards, will be developed in 
the UK.  This may be regarded as a cost-effective response to the level of risk that exists.  
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